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JURISDICTION
Under Rule 42(a) U.R.A.P. the Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over cases transferred from the Utah Supreme Court to
the Utah Court of Appeals.
Under Rule 3 U.R.A.P. the Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction
over a final order from a District Court. Such is the case here.

ISSUES
1. Did the trial
Christiansen

where

the

court err
court

in dismissing

determined

that

the Appellee

there were no

outstanding causes of action against Mr. Christiansen.
2. Did the trial court err in dismissing the Appellee Sykes
where the court determined that there were no outstanding causes
of action against Mr. Sykes.

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
REGULATIONS
None at issue

1

RULES &

FACTS

The original case was filed by Mr. Hatch et. al. on May 9
1983. The principal claims by Mr. Hatch are:

1) They were the owners of a piece of land that was about to
be sold at trustee sale.

2) Virginia Flynn had agreed to rescue the Mr. Hatch from the
sale.

3) Mr Sykes, Zions Bank and Zions Bank's attorney scared her
off by claiming that a lawsuit was possible and imminent.

4) The land was sold at trustee sale.

5) Mr. Christiansen bought the property on behalf of Mr.
Sykes.
The

case has been

off and

on

for the years due to

the

antipathy of the litigants and the fact that Mr. Hatch and some of
his alter egos have been in and out of bankruptcy several times
during the period. The three cases were all consolidated since they
had some basis in the same issues and facts. The root cause of the
controversy is a piece of property in Provo which Mr. Sykes and Mr.
Hatch both claimed to own. Both Mr. Sykes and Mr. Hatch claim that

2

many evil deeds were perpetrated by the other.
Mr. Sykes claims that Mr. Hatch contracted to sell him the
property and since reneged on the deal. Mr. Hatch claims that
because of Mr. Sykes vigorous pursuit of his claim to the property
a person willing to loan money on the property was scared off. Mr.
Hatch claims that the money would have saved the property from
foreclosure by Zions Bank.
The money was not loaned to Mr. Hatch and therefore the
property foreclosed on and sold to Mr. Christiansen at a sheriffs
sale.
Mr. Hatch filed suit against Mr. Sykes, Zions Bank, Mr.
Christiansen and Zions Bank's lawyers. Mr. Hatch settled its
problems with Zions and Zions lawyers for a cash payment. Due to
settlement

and

the

affirmation

of

the

sheriff's

sale

Mr.

Christiansen was dismissed from the suit on his motion. On separate
motion, all claims against Mr. Sykes were also dismissed after the
trial court determined that, with no claim on the property Mr.
Hatch no longer had a cause of action against Mr. Sykes. Mr. Sykes
counterclaims against Mr. Hatch and the Ragozzines were also
dismissed for failure to prosecute.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Slander of title requires that Mr. Hatch

have some interest

in the property. There is no interest in the property due to the
sale of the property and subsequent affirmation of the sale.
With the settlement of the property question with Zions Bank
there are no longer any prayers for relief that are valid.
The elements of fraud were not even alleged in the complaint
so no fraud could possibly exist.
There is no responsibility on the part of the court to create
the legal arguments and theories under which Mr. Hatch may recover.
After almost 10 years of litigation, Plaintiff should know what he
is suing for and why without the assistance of the court.

4

ARGUMENT

The lower court held that the claims of Mr. Hatch et al must
be dismissed based upon two independent grounds. The lower court
stated that the slander of title action could not be maintained,
given that Mr. Hatch no longer had an interest in the property in
question; and that even if he held such an interest, the complaint
no longer stated a relief which could be granted.
The second tier of the lowers court's decision revolves around
the undisputed fact that only prayers for relief 3 and 4 and
possibly 5 were still valid. These prayers read:
3. for punitive damages against defendant Zion's and
Sykes of $450,000 for willful and malicious conduct in
connection with the transaction which is the subject of
this complaint;
4. for actual damages of $150,000 in the event the
property is lost by the plaintiffs through the actions
of the defendants;
5. and the costs of this action, including a reasonable
attorney's fee together with such relief as the court may
deem just and proper.
Mr. Hatch in attempting to obtain summary disposition in
reversing the lower court's decision has proposed a series of
arguments:

SLANDER OF TITLE REQUIRES SOME INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY

First, Mr. Hatch claims that the lower court was wrong in its
5

holding that a slander of title requires that Mr. Hatch hold some
interest in the property.
The prevailing rule is and has been that where a party does
not have an interest in the property slandered he has no standing
to sue. The fact of a past interest is not sufficient to create
such standing. In Bennett v Pace, 731 P.2d 33 (Wyo 1987) a similar
situation to the

instant case was decided.

contractor placed

a mechanic's

In that case a

lien on the property

of the

plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently sold the property and then
brought suit against the contractor for slander of title in placing
the lien. The Supreme Court of Wyoming ruled that the plaintiff had
no standing to file such a suit since they no longer had an
interest in the property.
Such is the case here. In this case the lawsuit was filed
after the property had been foreclosed and subsequently sold. At
the time of the filing of the lawsuit Mr. Hatch did not have an
interest in the property. Therefore he had no standing to bring a
slander of title action.
Even if Mr. Hatch had some claim to the property at the
beginning of the suit, Mr. Hatch along with all other plaintiffs
during the pendency of the suit settled their claim to the
property. In that settlement the plaintiffs (Mr. Hatch) agreed in
their stipulation that:
Plaintiffs ... agree that the trustee's sale ... was a
bona fide, arm's length, non-collusive, valid and binding
Trustee's sale. ... Plaintiffs ... waive and abandon any
• • • claims and defenses .. • which • • • challenge or
dispute the validity ... of the Trustee's Sale or the
title of the purchaser at the Trustee's sale.
6

If Mr. Hatch had any claim to the property before the
settlement, any such claim was subsequently extinguished. Therefore
if Mr. Hatch had standing to assert slander of title previous to
the settlement, he had no such standing subsequent to it.
It is undisputed that Mr. Hatch has no current interest in the
property as required by a slander of title action. Therefore an
action for slander of title cannot proceed.

THERE IS NO LONGER A VALID PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Second, Mr. Hatch contends that the court was wrong in ruling
that the loss of the property in question was not due to the
actions of the defendants.
Neither Mr Christiansen nor Mr. Sykes et al foreclosed on the
property. That action was taken by Zion's bank when Mr. Hatch et
al failed to make the necessary payments. The property was then
sold at trustee's sale, not by Mr. Christiansen nor Mr. Sykes, but
at the behest of Zions bank.
Subsequent to the foreclosure and filing of the lawsuit any
rights

to

the

property

were

transferred

to

Zions bank

and

subsequent purchasers by the settlement negotiated by Mr. Hatch and
the other plaintiffs. Again, neither Mr. Christiansen nor Mr. Sykes
had any input or involvement in that settlement.
It is irrational to conclude that the loss of the property was
due to the actions of Mr. Christiansen or Mr. Sykes. The actions
7

precedent to the loss of the property were the result of actions
taken by Mr. Hatch et al.
There is therefore no basis to award relief based on prayer
for relief #4.
Since punitive damages are derivative in nature, if actual
damages cannot be awarded punitive damages likewise cannot be
awarded. Therefore prayer #3 is also no longer valid.
Given that there is no longer a prayer that could be granted,
there is no longer a set of facts that could lead to relief for the
plaintiffs.

THERE WAS NO SET OF FACTS ALLEGED UNDER WHICH RELIEF
COULD BE GRANTED

Third, Mr. Hatch's third and fourth arguments can be folded
together. Mr. Hatch argues that even if the relief requested in the
complaint was no longer valid, the court should have granted Mr.
Hatch some unspecified relief to which he was entitled and that the
lower court

should

not have decided

the case while

a real

controversy was outstanding.
Mr.

Hatch

relies

upon Rule

54(c)(1) U.R.C.P.

for this

interpretation. Mr. Hatch is misusing this rule in as much as this
rule grants the court broad discretion in formulating the type of
relief that is granted. This is not a rule of compulsion but
discretion for the bench. Further this rule does not force the
judge to recast the arguments and facts of the case in order to
8

formulate some legal theory or cause of action under which the Mr.
Hatch may recover. It is the burden of Mr. Hatch to carry the
burden of producing the theory and arguments that will demonstrate
his case, not that of the judge. Mr. Hatch has not carried this
burden.
The case was dismissed based upon defendants' motion for a
12(b)(6) dismissal because the pleadings did not state a cause of
action under which relief could be granted. A 12(b)(6) motion for
dismissal for failure of the pleadings is to be treated as a motion
for summary judgement. Such a motion should be granted only where
it appears as a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to
relief under no state of facts which could be proved in support of
the claim. See Hughes v. Howslev. 599 P.2d 1250,1252 (Utah 1979).
The pertinent facts of this appeal are not in dispute. The
plaintiffs settled their action with Zions Bank and agreed that the
trustee sale was valid. The defendants Christiansen and Sykes had
no part in that settlement. Likewise, the only involvement of Mr.
Christiansen in the subsequent sale was to purchase the property.
The defendants were not the cause of the loss of plaintiffs'
property. The property was "lost" at trustee's sale and remaining
claims were extinguished by the settlement between plaintiffs and
Zions bank.
But, even if we must go to the merits of the case, it is still
clear that no facts are alleged under which the cause of action
could possibly succeed. The plaintiff has alleged two causes of
action - fraud and slander of title. As we have seen above, the
9

slander of title action cannot survive as a matter of law since one
of the essential elements (title to the property) is missing.
Likewise fraud or misrepresentation is insufficient grounds
for relief in that the essential elements for such an action have
not even been alleged.
Mr. Hatch alleges in the cause of action for "Bad Faith and
Fraud" that Mr. Christiansen was the
"strawman purchaser for ZIONS, who had already entered
into an agreement with Defendant Sykes for the sale of
the subject premises, and that ZIONS, CHRISTIANSEN and
SYKES together conspired to defraud Plaintiffs of their
rightful claims to the premises11.
See First Amended Complaint page 7. Since Mr. Christiansen was not
in privity of contract with the Plaintiffs nor in any relationship
which would require the exercise of good faith, the cause of action
for bad faith does not apply to Mr. Christiansen.
Mr. Hatch claims in his third cause of action a right to
recover for conspiracy to defraud. Frankly, I have no idea what
conspiracy to defraud might mean. Conspiracy is not a recognized
tort and is normally seen only in criminal matters in conjunction
with a crime. Assuming therefore, that Mr. Hatch is claiming that
Mr. Christiansen and/or Mr. Sykes committed a fraud against him,
we will explore that possibility.
Mr.

Hatch

contends

that the broad

definition

of

fraud

contained in Black's law dictionary is pertinent to the case. But,
Black's contains no elements for the prima facia case nor does it
explain what an "artifice to defraud" might be. Nor does Mr. Hatch
explain how his case might show this to be a fraud under the
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Black's definition.
The actual tort of fraud is seen only as encompassed by the
tort of intentional misrepresentation which is also known as fraud
or deceit. To establish intentional misrepresentation (or fraud)
the following elements must be proved:
1. Misrepresentation (made by defendant)
2. Scienter - malice
3.

An

intent

to

induce

plaintiff's

reliance

upon

the

misrepresentation.
4. Causation
5. Justifiable reliance
6. Damages.
The case alleged by Mr. Hatch fails on at least four or these
elements. First, there simply was no misrepresentation and no
allegation of misrepresentation committed by Mr. Christiansen or
Mr. Sykes. Mr. Christiansen did not make any statements to Mr.
Hatch which were a false representation of a material past or
present fact. Indeed, the only communication alleged between Mr.
Christiansen and Mr. Hatch is the presentation of a Lis Pendens to
Mr. Christiansen immediately prior to the sale.
Second, there is no allegation of intent to induce the Mr.
Hatch's reliance upon a misrepresentation. As we have seen, there
is no allegation that any misrepresentation occurred.
Third, there is no causation. Mr. Hatch seeks damages for the
loss of his property. The loss of the property was caused by the
foreclosure and subsequent sale by Zions. The person who bought the
IX

property (Mr. Christiansen) can not be held responsible for the
default of the Plaintiffs.
Fourth, there is no justifiable reliance. First there was no
misrepresentation on which to rely. Even if there had been some
misrepresentation,

there

was

no

reliance

upon

that

misrepresentation that could have caused damages. Even if Mr.
Christiansen had claimed himself not to be a purchaser for the
benefit of Sykes or Zions and it later came to be shown that Sykes
and Zions had induced Mr. Christiansen to buy the property, there
was no reliance by Mr. Hatch on such an assertion. The motivation
for

Mr.

Christiansen's

purchase

of

the

property

is

of

no

consequence to the fact that the property was being sold due to
foreclosure. No reliance by Mr. Hatch on the independence, or lack
thereof, of Mr. Christiansen could change the essential facts of
foreclosure and sale. Reliance on any statement of Mr. Christiansen
was not alleged by the Plaintiffs, nor could any such reliance be
justifiable.
Hence, fraud or misrepresentation is not alleged

in its

essential elements. There is therefore no set of facts alleged
under which relief could be granted for fraud.
Mr. Hatch wants to have it both ways. He wishes to take the
money from Zion's Bank and declare the trustee sale valid, while
still claiming as interest in the land and a right to recover from
Mr. Christiansen (who merely purchased the property at trustee
sale) and Mr. Sykes. Judge Mower correctly

decided

that by

affirming the validity of the trustee sale that the property was
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no longer at issue and the Mr. Hatch had no interest in it. Judge
Mower also noted that there was no set of facts alleged under which
there was a cause of action by Mr. Hatch.

CONCLUSION
There

are

no

facts

alleged

which

could

justify

the

continuation of this lawsuit. There is no prayer for relief which
could be granted, since title to the property in question has been
settled voluntarily between Mr. Hatch and Zions. Further the
essential elements for recovery based on slander of title or fraud
either do not exist or have not been alleged.
This vexatious litigation has been going on for more than a
decade. If there are insufficient facts at this late date to
justify the continued litigation, there never will be. The decision
of the trial court to dismiss should be affirmed.

4- A:
Sam Primavera
Attorney for Defendant Appellee Christiansen

Dwane Sykes
Defendant Appellee pro se
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